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ABSTRACT 
We develop theoretically and test experimentally a one 
dimensional model of two candidate competition with incomplete 
information. We consider a sequence of elections in which the same 
general issue predominates from election to election, but where the 
voters have no contemoporaneous information about the policy positions 
adopted by the candidates, and where the candidates have no 
contemporaneous information about the preferences of the voters. 
Instead, participants have access only to contemporaneous endorsement 
data of an interest group, and to historical policy positions of the 
previous winning candidates. We define a stationary rational 
expectations equilibrium to the resulting (repeated) game of 
incomplete information, and show that in equilibrium, all 
participants, voters and candidates alike, end up acting as if they 
had complete information: Voters end up voting for the correct 
candidate, and candidates end up converging to the median voter. 
SEQUENTIAL ELECTIONS WITH LIMITED INFORMATION 
Richard D .  McKelvey 
Cal ifornia Inst i tute of Technology
Peter C. Orde shook 
Univers i ty of Texas at Aust in
(July 9, 1984 ) 
The wide spread l ack of fam i l iari ty with prominent issue s of 
publ ic pol icy, along with c onfus ion on party pos i t ion . • .  attests
to the fra i l t i e s  of the pol itical translation process . The fact 
that a pol icy que stion is subj ected to  intense partis i an debate 
between elections does not assure us that at the next elec tion 
the pub l ic wi l l  respond to the substance of the argument . 
[Campbel l e t  al . The American Voter ,  p. 1 88] 
1 .  Introduction 
Desp i te the we l l  estab l ished empirical general i ty expressed in 
the prece eding quote, spatial mode l s  of elections typical ly make 
severe and unreal i s t ic assumptions about the informat i on available  to 
candidates and voters . Specifical ly, i t  is general ly assumed that 
voters know the pol icy po s i tions adopted by the candidates and that 
candidates know the preferences  of voters .  Because these assumptions 
contrast so sharply with empirical real ity, many scholars, who might 
otherwise be sympathetic to the perspectives of such mode l s, discount 
the ir pol i tical rel evance .  
To assess the extent to  which the conclus i ons of  the spatial 
model ing l i terature are dependent on such heroic information 
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assumpt i ons, thi s  paper devel ops and experimenta l ly tests an 
al ternative model of elections with de central ized and incomplete 
informat ion assumptions . Spec if ical ly, we consider a sequence of 
elections in which voters have � contemporaneous informat ion about 
candidate pos i tions and candidate s  have� contemporaneous informat ion 
about voter preferenc e s .  The only information avai l able to the 
participants consists  of contemporaneous endorsement data and 
historical data on the past elect ion outcomes .  
The model devel oped here i s  not nece ssari ly more empirica l ly 
accurate than the previous l iterature in i t s  description of the 
information availab l e  to participant s .  Rather, we move to the 
oppos ite extreme from that l iterature by assuming that participant s 
have less informat ion than they might be expec ted to have on the basis 
of empi rical evidence . Yet, in spi te of thi s  dearth of informat ion in 
our model ,  our primary conclus ion is that the act i ons of both voters 
and candidates  in equi l ibrium approximate the act ions one ant icipates 
under ful l  informat i on .  Thus, in the long run, al l part ic ipants 
behave exac tly as if they are ful ly informed: the candidates converge 
to the median voter ide al point, and each voter votes for the correct 
candidate-- the candidate cl osest to his ideal point . 
This paper is similar to another paper of ours (McKel vey and 
Orde shook [ 1984a])in which we al so develop a mode l of elec tions with 
incomplete information. But thi s  paper dif fers signif icantly from 
that one in that : ( 1 )  Here we model a sequence of elections rather 
than a single elec tion. ( 2) .Here the information source for 
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uninformed voters ( and candidat e s )  is historical da ta rather than pol l 
data. ( 3 )  Here all voters are ini t ial ly uninformed, unl ike our other 
paper, in which we assume asymmetric informat ion, with some informed 
voters and some uninformed voters .  However the basic conclusion of 
thi s  paper is similar to our conclus i on in [1984a]: Namely, 
equi l ibrium behavior in both mode l s  extracts ful l informat ion . 
2. Mot ivat ion for the Model
The low level of pol itical awarene s s  and sophist ication of the 
average voter is, by now, a wel l e stab l i shed fact . The l iterature is 
repl ete with examples where the voter displays ignorance of such basic 
pol i t ical currency as the number of senators from his s tate, the name 
of hi s congressman, etc . ( e g . ,  G�eenstein [ 1963], Almond and Verba 
[ 1 963], and Kinder and Sears [1985] ) . The maj or elect ion studies have 
concluded that the typical voter is unaware of the pos i tions of 
candidates on important issue s and that he is unable  to conceptua l ize  
pol itics in the ideological terms that are taken for granted by 
academics and pol i ticians (Berel son et al [ 1 954] ,  Campbel l et al 
[ 1 960]) .  Empirical work points instead to  a voter who, if he has any 
pol icy preferences, is much more narrowly self intere sted, and who 
rel ie s  on cue s from the party and other interest groups to inform his 
vote (Repass [1971], Kukl inski et al [ 1 982] ) .  Our mode l is an attempt 
to model an electorate compr ised of such voters. 
The voter that we try and capture in our model is the voter 
whose interest in pol itics stems from a narrow concern about his own 
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economic wel l  being .  However, our voter i s  qui te uninformed about 
the specific pol icy pos i t ions espoused by the candidates, e i ther 
because he doe s not read the newspapers , or because he does not 
bel i eve the promises made by the candidates, or because the candidates 
themselve s are sufficiently ambiguous to make it impossible to 
discover the ir  true posi t ions . Instead, he assoc iates ( or 
dissociate s )  his interests with those of a particular group in 
society, and recogniz ing h i s  common intere st with that group, is 
therefore wil l ing to  trust that the l eadership of that group speaks 
for him . This is the category of voter that is l abeled " ideology by 
proxy" by Campbel l e t  al [ 1960], and they est imate that such voters 
comprise about 45% of the electorate . Our voter also is aware of the 
party identification of the two candidate s, and himse l f  has a 
predi sposi tion for one party or the other, based on his past 
experience with the pol ic i e s  that have be en enacted by that party when 
it has been in power .  
The candidates  i n  our model are typical Downsian candidate s :  
they just try and adopt pol icy po si tions t o  win each election a s  i t  
rol l s  around. But since our voters are in a fog, the candidates are 
a l so in a fog. The voters cannot art iculate their pol icy preferences, 
so candidates are unsure what pol ic ies they shoul d adopt .  Should they 
re spond to the interest groups, or shoul d they try and ferret out the 
preferences  of the voters? The only clue they have to the preferences  
of  the voters is the history of  election outcomes, but given the 
nature of the voters in our model, that seems a pretty tenuous clue . 
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Can an el ec torate compri sed entirely of voters and candidates 
sati sfying the above de script i on'come anywhere near achieving the type 
of pol icy outcomes that  woul d be expected from a ful ly informed 
electorate? We inve st igate thi s  que stion for a s imple model with only 
one interest group and a one dimensi onal is sue space, but our answer 
is that over a sequence of elections, it is possible  that a ful l 
informat i on outcome can be achieved . Of course a real istic model woul d 
al low for mul t iple issue s and interest groups--but because of the 
theoret ical complexi ty, we leave thi s extensi on unt i l  late r .  
To  formul ate our model, w e  use the notion o f  "rational 
expectations equil ibrium" which has been successful ly appl ied in 
economics to model s  of marke ts with incompl ete informat ion ( se e  
Grossman [1 982] for a review of this l iterature ) .  Our approach is t o  
assume that, when information is costly, peopl e take cue s from other 
endogenous source s  that are easily observable, which they bel ieve 
convey useful informat ion . They use this data to make predi c t i ons 
about the parameters relevant to their wel fare . In rat ional 
expectat ions equil ibr ium (which can be thought of as a steady state of 
the system) al l individual s  must be maximiz ing thei r  ut i l i ty 
condi t i onal on the inferences they make from the data they ob serve , 
and a l l  individual s  must be making statist ica l ly correct inference s, 
which are not countermanded by the data they then actua l ly observe . 
Our model consists of a sequence of elections in which the 
same general (one dimensi onal ) is sue predominates in the publ ic's mind 
from elect ion to elect ion. We model thi s  as a repeated game where the 
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players are n c i tizens (voters) plus two candidate s .  The candidates 
may be thought of as pol itical parti e s ,  who select new nominees  (with 
different pol icy pl atforms ) in e ach election .  In  add i tion to the se 
candidates, there is an interest group whose whose pol icy preferences  
are  known to  the voters and whose so le  funct i on is to endorse the 
candidate that it prefers. 
In each election, the candidates f irst adopt pol icy pos i t ions, 
the interest group then endorses the candidate it prefers, and then an 
e l ec t i on is hel d, in which the voters vote for one candidate or 
another, or abstain .  We assume that the voters are al l uninformed 
about the pos i tions adopted by the candidates before the election .  
Instead, they have access to information of  two general type s :  
histori cal data and the endorsement . We assume that candidates d o  not 
know the preferences of voters be fore they adopt their pol icies. 
However, they have access  to the same historical and endorsement da ta 
that is ava i lable to the voters . 
The endorsement repre sents the truthful preferences  of the 
interest group be tween the two candidate posi tions . But it is assumed 
to convey only ordinal informat ion about which candidate is to the 
left and which candidate is to the right on the issue . Of c ourse, in 
the real world, endorsement s typica l ly convey richer informat ion than 
thi s .  For example, the intensi ty of an endorsement might  be used by 
voters to indicate the "di stance" be tween the candidat es  or the 
distance be tween the candida te or the leade rship of the intere st 
group . In our model, though, we ignore the cardinal information 
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conveyed by endorsements. 
With regard to historical information, we assume voters have 
knowledge of the policies of past administrations of each candidate's 
party--and of the effects of those policies on their individual 
welfare. Theoretically and experimentally, we incorporate this 
information by assuming that the positions of winning (but not losing) 
candidates in earlier elections are known. 
The equilibrium that we define to the above repeated game is 
what we call a stationary rational expectations equilibrium. Voters 
have beliefs about the likely positions that each candidate will 
adopt, which they arive at by making statistical projections based on 
the historical positions of past winning candidates. The voters then 
adopt voting strategies which maximize their expected utility given 
these beliefs. In equilibrium. their beliefs must be rational, in the 
sense that the distribution of actual positions that each candidate 
ends up adopting must agree with the distribution that the voter would 
predict. The candidates, on the other hand, do not know the voter 
preferences and voting strategies, so they treat the game as a 
repeated game with unknown payoff function. Hence they look for a 
stationary mixed strategy equilibrium to the game. I. e., an 
equilibrium strategy for the candidates is a mixed strategy such that 
if the candidate uses this mixed strategy in each election, then the 
distribution of his winning positions is the same as the distribution 
of positions he has adopted. 
Before proceeding, we give some further discussion of the 
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above assumptions. With regards to the historical data, note that our 
model assumes that voters only learn the positions of winning 
candidates. In our model, the candidate positions represent the 
positions that candidates actually adopt if they win the election. 
Clearly, it is not necessary for the candidates to reveal this 
position to the voters until after the election. In fact they may 
have incentives to conceal their positions from the voters, and 
empirically, they indeed do seem to do this (Page [1978], Chapfer 6 ) . 
Furthermore, the voters have no particular reason to believe what the 
candidates do promise. Typically, then, it will be very difficult for 
even a well informed voter to be able to get good information on the 
likely candidate positions. However after the election, the winning 
candidate must implement a policy, and we assume that this policy 
becomes common knowledge. 
Our model assumes that the voters know the policy position of 
the interest groups. Thus we trade voter knowledge of candidate 
positions for voter knowledge of the interest group position. At 
first glance, this may seem like a poor trade off--substituting one 
unrealistic assumption for another. However there are theoretical and 
empirical reasons justifying this assumption: (1) Candidates are 
transient actors on the political scene, with incentives to conceal 
rather than reveal their true policy positions, whereas interest 
groups are much more permanent. Because of their constant and 
selective base of support. interest groups are less able to conceal 
their policy preferences. ( 2 )  Empirical evidence shows that voters 
do, in fact have fairly good information about interest group 
positions, oven on relatively technical issues. (Seo, e.g., 
Kuklinski. Metlay A Kay (1982]). (3) We do not need to assume that 
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tho voter knows tho exact position of tho interest group on tho policy 
scale. but we need only assume that tho voter knows enough about tho 
interest group to be able to interporot an endorsement as being a 
"liberal" or "conservative" endorsement. 
With respect to tho sequential structure of our experiments 
and theory, several earlier commentators on this research objected to 
tho assumption that tho same candidates compote over tho sequence of 
oloctions--rofcrring to tho analysis as a Harold Stassen model. 
Uowcvor it is important to interpret tho sequence of candidate 
positions as tho positions of tho nominees of tho two major parties. 
Tho historical record, and voters' interpretations of that record. 
then, are viewed as tho basis for partisian preferences. Admittedly, 
our theory and experiments ignore certain facts that permit drawing 
oven stronger inferences from partisian labels, including tho fact 
that candidates must secure nominations from a biased sample of tho 
electorate, which predisposes them to support and implement certain 
policies. Those facts, though, would almost certainly induce oven 
more rapid convergence of voter beliefs to tho candidates' true 
strategies. In contrast to the assumption that partisian labels and 
interest group endorsements are devices for reducing the costs to 
citizens of gathering the information necessary to cast an 
"approximately" informed vote, our analysis suggests that these 
devices may be sufficient for a wholly informed vote. 
Finally it should be noted that tho typo of voting behavior 
that we assume is related to tho notions of retrospective voting 
developed by Fiorina (1981). I. o., tho voter does not vote on tho 
basis of promised performance, but on tho basis of delivered output. 
Tho voter thus develops oxpoctatioua of future performance of 
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candidates baaed on their average past porforaance, and ho rewarda or 
punishes candidates in future elections based on whether during their 
incumbency, they have done bettor or worse than expected. To this 
picture of voting behavior, we simply add tho dependence also on 
interest group ondorsomont. 
3 • Th.£ E!u:!!!.! � 
We assume that there are two candidates, designated by 
K = (1,2}, n �. designated by N = (a1,a2, • • • an}, and a ono 
dimensional convex policy space. X � ll • Each voter, a1 1 N, has a 
utility function ui :X � JR, which is sy-etric and single peaked 
• 
about an ideal point yi. We let t0 be the throe element set 
consisting of the two candidates, plus a third element, "O". which is 
used to represent "no endorsement" or "abstention." Thus. 
K0 = (l,2,0} =KU (O}. Let F be the set of functions from K0 into 
K0• (Elements of F will be used to represent voter strategics.) For 
any k e K, we use k to denote the opposition candidate. I.e., 
k r; K - {k}. \Ve let IJ be the set of Borel measurable subsets of X. 
We now define a sequence of identical games, where in each 
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game, the players consist of the candidates, K, together with the 
voters, N. The strategy space for candidate k, and voter a. are 1 
denoted Sk and Bi respectively. We assume Sk = X and Bi = F for all 
k e K and ai e N. So candidate strategies are positions on the issue, 
while voter strategies are decisions as to who vote for as a function 
of which candidate is endorsed (see below). We write S = s1 X s2, and 
B = B1 X · · ·  X Bn, and we denote specific strategy choices of the 
candidates and voters, respectively, by s = Cs1,s2) e S and 
b = Cb1, ... ,bn) e B. For any s, s' e S and b, b' & B, let (s
(s� .b) 
denote the strategy n+2 tuple obtained by replacing the k'th 
candidate's strategy in s by s�, and (s,blb�) denote the strategy n+2 
tuple resulting from replacing the ith voter's strategy, b., by b '.. 1 1 
Given a strategy n+2 tuple (s,b) e S X B, we now define the payoff 
function for the game, in several steps. 
First, we define the endorsement to be a function, e:S � K, 
of the candidates' positions on the issue. Specifically, 
{ if '1 "2 
e (s) = 2 if s2 ( s1 
0 otherwise 
( 3 . 1)  
Thus e (s) tells the voters which candidates is to the left and which 
is to the right on the election issue. For any specific vector of 
votes by the n voters, p e K�, and for any k & K0, we write 
vk(p) ( {ai eN( pi kl I (3.2) 
and 
12 
{' if v1 (p) > v2(pl 
w(p)·= 2 if v2 (p) > v1 (p) ( 3 .3) 
0 otherwise 
(Here we use ·the notation IA( to represent the number of elements of a 
set A.) Then, for any (s,b) e S X B, the vote for candidate� is 
given by 
vk(s,b) = vk(b (e(s))) (3 .4 ) 
The winning candidate, or election outcome is 
w(s,b) = w(b (e (s))) ( 3 .5) 
where w(s,b) = 0 means a fair coin is tossed to determine if 1 or 2 
wins. We can then define the payoff to voter ai & N by
M.(s,b) = ui(sw(s,b))' 1 ( 3.6 ) 
Here, we use the notation s0 to represent the outcome resulting from a 
tie--namely a fair lottery between s1 and s2,--and we assume that the 
utility a voter associates with a tie is simply ui(s0> = }ui<s1> 
+ }ui<s2). Expression ( 3 . 6 ) ,  then, simply states that voter i's 
payoff equals the utility he associates with the position (strategy) 
of the winning candidate, w(s,b). Finally, the payoff to candidate 
k e K is 
{ 
1 if w( s, b) = k 
�'J.(s,b) = -1 if w(s,b) = k ( 3 . 7 )  
0 otherwise 
So the candidate gains or loses a unit of utility depending or 
whether he wins or loses the election. These definitions, then, 
specify the normal form of an election game that is represented by the 
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extensive form portrayed in Figure 1 ( which we have simpl ified by 
considering only two voters and by lett ing the pol icy space , X, 
contain only three element s--denoted by x, y and z ,  where x < y < z ) . 
First the candidates have a simultaneous move in which they each 
choose a pol icy pos i tion .  After the candida te s have moved, voters 
then have a simul taneous move in which they vote for a candidat e .  The 
voters' move can be thought of as the "election . " However , the 
strategies of the candidates  are not revealed to the voters before the 
elect ion. Instead, only endorsement informati on is reveal ed: that 
i s ,  through e ( s ) , voters are told which candida te ' s  posi tion is 
fur ther to the left .  For exampl e ,  if the candidates have chosen 
identical pos i t ions , Voter 1 knows this but he does not know whether 
he is at his 1st ,  5th or 9 th dec i s i on node . I . e . , he doe s  not know 
whether s = ( x , x ) , s = ( y, y) , or s =  ( z , z) . Simil arly, if candida te 1 
is endorsed, the voter knows that s1 < s2 , but he doe s  not know 
whether thi s  corre sponds to s = ( x , y) , s = ( x , z) or s =  ( y, z) . The 
function vk( s , b )  tal l ies the vote for each candidate and determine s 
the winner ,  w ( s , b ) . The payoff to a voter is the uti l i ty he 
associates wi th the pos i t ion of the w inning candidate ,  while  a 
candidate ' s  payoff is 1 if he wins, -1 if he lose s ,  and 0 if the 
el ect ion is a t i e. 
The preceeding structure model s  the l imi ted informat ion that 
is avai l able to voters in a s ingle � of the game (namely, voters 
see only the endorsement , and not the candida te posi tions ) , but it 
doe s  not model the information that is available to voters or 
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candidates from previous plays of the game . We assume that the 
candidates do not know the vot�r characterist ics--i.e . , they do not 
* 
know the voter ideal point s ,  yi . However, al l players observe the
outcome w ( s , b )  and the pos i tion, sw( s , b ) ' of winning candidate s  in 
prev ious plays of the game . 
We now def ine an equil ibrium for this repeated, incompl ete  
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informat ion game .  But f irst we need some further notation . Let � be 
a set of probabi l ity measure s  on Sk . So '1._ represents the set of 
admissible mixed strategi e s  of candidate  k. We assume throughout that 
e lements of � are e i ther absolutely continuous (with respect to 
Lebe sque measure on X), or degenerate point masses ( i . e . , �( {x } )  = 1 
for some x & X). We l e t  A= A1 X A2 • So for I.. = Cl..1 , 1..2) & A. I.. 
represent s the product measure of 1..1 and 1..2• 
Given I.. C l..1 , 1..2 )  & A. we de f ine several derived measures on 
lB. For k e K, j & K0 , and b e B, def ine 
l..kj (
' ) :  The distribut i on of sk given that
j is endorsed, ( i . e .  given e ( s )  = j ) .
l..
kw(
" l b ) : The distribut ion of sk g iven
that k wins ( If k never wins ,  
then l..kw( " l b )  = I.._ (") ) .k 
I.. ( " l b ) : The distribut ion of winning pos i tions , w 
i.e., of sw(s , b ) "
The se probab i l i ty measures are def ined formal ly in Appendix A. 
( 3 . 8 )  
( 3 . 9 )  
( 3  .10) 
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Fina l ly ,  for any y e A. we def ine B (y) k B by 
B (y )  {b 
* 
eBI \t'beB, b � e arg
1 
max JEy[Mi ( s , b l b � ) ] } . ( 3 . 11 )  ' 
b .eB. 
1 1 
Here 1E is the expect a t i  on under y .  Hence B (  I..) is the set of opt imal y 
voting s trategies by the voters given be l iefs y = ( y1 , y2) of the 
candida te strategie s .  
Definit ion �-1 A Rat ional Expectat ions Equi l ibr ium (REE) for the game 
* * * 
def ined by ( 3 . 6 ) - ( 3 .7 ) is a triple (I.. , y  , b  ) e AX AX B sati sfying
(Vl) 
(V2) 
(Cl) 
b
* 
e B(y
*
) ,
• • * 
For al l k e K, yk = l..kwc · l b  ) ,
* * * 
For al l k e K, l..k = l..kwc · l b  ) .
• 
In short , l e tt ing I.. & A be the actual distribut ion of strategi es  
• 
adopted by the candidate s ,  and y e A be each voter ' s  bel ief about the 
distribution of a candi date ' s  pos i tions , thi s  def ini t ion of 
equi l ibrium requi res that : (Vl) Each voter adopts a vot ing strategy ,  
• 
b i ' that  maximizes his expected util i ty ,  condi t ional on his bel ief 
about the candidate s '  pol icy po si tions . (V2) The voters have
rati onal expectat ions about the candidate pos i t ions : the distribution 
that voters bel ieve a candi date ' s  posi tion fol lows must agree with the 
di stribut i on of the observed winning posi tions of that candidat e .  
That  is ,  i n  equi l ibr ium, voters cannot bel ieve that the mixed strategy 
of a candida te di ffers f rom the ob served distribut i on of that 
candidate ' s  strategies ( g iven our earl ier assumpti ons , a candida te ' s  
position i s  observed only when he wins) . ( C l )  Final ly ,  the 
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distribut ion of strategies adopte d  by each candida te is in equil ibrium 
if thi s  dist ribution equa l s  the distribution of his own winning 
positions .  
A Rational Expectations Equil ibrium represent s the type of 
behavior one would expect ,  in the l ong run, from the repeated p lay of 
the game (3.6)-(3.7), assuming that pl ayers have the l imited 
informat ion as de scribed above .  Thus ,  voters do  not observe the 
candidate s' pol icy positions before they vote ,  but they do observe the 
endor sement , al ong with the previous history of winning pos itions . A 
* 
voter ' s  equil ibrium strategy take s his bel ief yk about the
distribut ion of each candidate ' s  posi tion, based on the historical 
da ta , and, given this be l ief ,  maximizes  his uti l i ty condi tional on the 
endorsement . Note that as l ong as the candi da tes draw their  posi tions 
from a stationary distribut ion, condi tion V2 is satisf ied if voters 
perform an ordinary l inear regression on the past winning positions of 
* 
each candidate to arrive at their  bel ief, yk ' of candidate k ' s
po sition .  Whil e  this  de cision rul e  for voters appears 
straightforward, the impl ica tions of condi tion Cl are perhaps l e ss 
clear .  Since candidates  do not know voter ide al point s ,  they cannot 
know the payof f function of the single  stage game .  But , because we 
are interested in a stat ionary equi l ibrium to the repeated game , our 
definition of equi l ibrium suppose s that the candidates assume that the 
payoff funct ion for the game is the same from period to period and 
that they seek a mixed strategy equi l ibrium to this repeated game .  
Because they must find this  equil ibrium without knowing the game ' s  
payoff funct ion, Condi t ion Cl assumes that candidates fol low a 
strategy of matching their  mixed strategies to the observed 
distribut ion of their  previous winning pos i tions . 
Now in any REE, ( A
*
, y
*
, b
*
) ,  we can show that voter bel iefs
must corre spond to the di stribut ion of strategies chosen by the 
* 
candida te s ,  i·�·· A * y • Further , opt imal voting behavior can be
* * 
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characterized in terms of the distributions A .k and A Hence a REE 
can be characterized more simply as ,  
J jk 
* * * 
Proposit ion 1·  A Rational Expectation Equil ibrium ( A  , y  , b  ) c an be
characterized by a pa ir (A
*
,b
*
) & A X  B, where y* = A* , and (A* , b*)
satisf ies : 
* * ( Vl ' ) b e B( A ) , 
( Cl ' )  
* 
for al 1 k e K ,  ;>,.k 
* * 
Akw( "  l b  ) • 
* 
Fur ther ,  for al l ai & N and al l j & K, bi satisfies 
* 
b . (k )1 j if lE * [ui ( x ) ]  > 
Ajk 
1E * [u . ( x ) ]
A_ 1 
jk 
for al l k e K with ;1.
*
( {s e s l e ( s ) = k)) F O.
* 
Here ,  ;>,. repre sent s the distribut ion of candidate po sitions as
wel l as the voter bel ief s .  So ( C l ' )  requi res that the distribut ion 
adopted by each candida te equal s the distribution of his winning 
pos itions ,  and (Vl ' )  requi res that each voter should adopt a voting 
strategy that for each possible endorsement , maximiz es  his expected 
* 
util ity with re spect to A , condit ional on the endorsement .
A probabi l i ty distribut i on Ak e I\_ is said to be symmetric 
*
around x & 1R if its cumulative densi ty funct i on Fk :lR � [ 0 , 1 ]  
* * 
satisfies Fk( x  +t} + Fk( x  -t} = 1 for al l t e lR. 
* * 
Cl early if Ak is 
symmetric around x , 
* 1 then Fk ( x  } = 2 and x We l e t  As !::=A = EA ( x ) . k 
denote the se t of measures  A =  ( A1 , A2 ) such that Al = Az and such that 
* * 
Ak i s  symmetric around x for some x & X. Our f irst theorem shows 
that any REE with A
* 
in As must e ither be degenerate (i.�·· with
* * 
Al = Az both being point masse s )  or we must have the candidates ' 
expected pol icy pos i t ions equal ing the ideal point of the medi an 
voter .  ( Note that the assumpt ion of symmetry is required only for 
Theorem 1 ,  not for Theorem 2 ) .  
Theorem l· If n i s  odd , and ( A* ,b
*
) e AX B characterizes a REE, wi th 
A
*
e As. then e i ther 
( a )  
( b )  
* 
where y 
* * 
Al ( {x } }  = A2 C {x} }  = 1 for some x e X or 
*1E * (x )  = lE * (x )  = y • 
Al Az 
is the medi an of the ideal point s ,  
* 
{ y  i} .
Ily introducing an additional stabil i ty condi t ion, we can 
narrow the class of admissible REE ' s further . For thi s  re sul t ,  we 
endow I\_ with the weak topology . 
* * 
De finit ion. If ( A  ,b  ) characteriz es  a REE, then i t  is stable i f ,  for
* * 
each k & K, there is a neighborhood N(Ak) of Ak such that whenever 
* . 
( A',b ' )  e AX B satisf ies Ak & N(Ak) ,  A_ k
* 
A_ and b' e E( A ' ) , then 
k 
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A
1 
( " lb ' )  w A
* 
( " lb*> • w 
Thus, a REE i s  .stable  if and only if , whenever one candidate 
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change s his distribut ion, and voters vote opt imal ly (g iven the new 
distr ibution ) , the distribution of winning posi ti ons doe s  not change . 
So in a stable  REE, each candidate  adopt s  the distribut ion of observed 
winning pos i t ions ,  and nei ther candidate by uni lateral ly dev iating 
from thi s  di s tribut ion, can change the observed distribution of 
winning pos i ti ons .  The fol low ing theorem shows that the only stabl e 
REE occur s when both candidates  are at the median voter ide al point 
thus , any REE resul ts in candidates  ( and voters )  behaving as  if they 
have compl e te informat ion. 
Theorem �: There exi sts  a stable  REE. Further , if n is odd and 
* * 
( A  , b  ) e AX B characterize s  a stab l e  REE, then
* * * * * * 
A1 ( {y }) = A2 ( {y }) = 1 for y e X, where y is a median ideal point 
of the electorate . 
4. A Dynamic Process 
Our def inition of a Rat ional Expectations Equi l ibrium is 
sta t i c .  However, it is possible  to de f ine a dynamic  process by which 
the bel iefs and strategies of the players are adj usted, which 
converge s in some cases to a rational expectations equi l ibrium as we 
de fine i t .  The process is highly sty l ized and arti ficial , and as is 
ev ident from the experimental section that fol lows ,  actual convergence 
take s pl ace much more quickly than is impl ied by the dynamic proce ss 
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that we present .  Nevertheless thi s  proce ss il lustrate s  the force s 
that drive the system towards equil ibr ium, so it i s  instructive to 
pre sent it. 
We def ine a sequence { (At , yt ,bt) };=O 
� AX AX B as fol lows:
Pick arb itrary ( Ao ,yo .bo ) & AX AX B and i & N, such that bo e B(yo) . 
Then. assuming (At-l ,yt-l , bt-l ) has been def ined, we def ine ( At, yt, bt)
to satisfy 
( a )  
( b )  
bt & B(yt) 
t For al l k & K, Yk A
t 
k A
t-1 ( . l bt-l )kw • 
So the above dynamic  process works as fol lows :  Candidates 
start with arbitrary strategies ,  AO = ( A�, A�) , and voters with 
arb itrary bel iefs yo 
voter strateg ie s ,  bO 
( y� ,y�) about the candidate strategies .  The 
(bo bo bo ) . . d ·1 · . 1 • 2 • • • • • n • max1m1z e expecte ut1 1ty, 1n
every contingency , subj ect to the voter bel ief s .  We can imagine thi s  
s et  of strategies  be ing played for a large number of periods, at  which
point voters and candidates look back at the hi story of what has 
occurred . Candidate s  then rev ise their strategies by changing their 
mixed strategy to A1 = ( Ai . A;) . Thi s  corre sponds to each candi date 
rev ising his strategy so that it agrees with the di stribution of hi s 
pa st winning strategies .  ( If  he never wins, he mimics his opponent. ) 
Voters ,  simil arly, rev i se the ir  be l iefs of candidate strategies to 
1 y (yi ,y�), which is a bel ief which is consi stent with the winning
candi date positions that they have observed. Note y1 = A1 . Final ly, 
voters rev ise the ir  voting strategies to bl 1 1 Cb1 , • . •  ,bn) ,  _to be 
22 
uti l ity maximiz ing subj ect to their new bel iefs .  
Next, players adopt the strategies and bel iefs (A1 , y1 ,b1 ) for 
a large number of periods, at which point they look at the history of 
winning pos i tions generated by ( A1 ,y1,b1 ) and rev ise their bel iefs and 
strategies to ( A2 , y2 ,b2 ) ,  etc . 
Figure 2 il lustrate s the above dynamic  proce ss for a case with 
three voters with preference s of the form u.( x )  = - Ix - y�I. where1 1 
* * * 
yi e 1R. 
* 
We assume Y1 - 4 ,  y2 = 0 , y3 = 4 .  Since for t > 0 we have
At yt , we begin with t 1 and assume r1 = A1 , where A� - N( 0 ,4 )  and 
A; - N( l .3 , . 25 ) .  Figure 2 a  il lustrate s the computation of ( A2 , y2 ,b2) .
Voter s  vote on the basis of their be l iefs .  But voters al so observe 
the endor sement before they vote . Hence , they can condition their 
vote on the endorsement. If the voters ob serve that Candidate 1 i s  
endorsed, for exampl e ,  then the distributions of Candidate 1 and 
Candidate 2 ' s pos iti on conditional on the endorsement yields Ai1 and
1 A2l 0 The voter then computes his expected uti l ity under Ail and A;1 •
respectively, to determine which candidate to vote for . Simil arly . if 
Candidate 2 is endorsed, the voter compute s Ai2 and A;2• and maximiz es
expected util ity under the se distributions . This y ields the 
strategies b1 = (bi,b;,b�) indicated in the tabl e .  So, for exampl e ,  
b �  satisf i e s  bi( l )  = l ,  and bi( 2) = 2 ,  whereas b;  sati sf ies b;( l )  = 2 
and b�( 2 )  = 1. Hence Voter 1 always vote s for the endorsed candidate , 
whereas Voter 3 vote s for the unendorsed candidate . 
The above voting strategies yield a new di stribution of 
winning candi date s .  In particular notice that the endorsed candidate 
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always wins . So the distribut ion of winning posi ti ons for Candi da te  1 
i s  '-iw< " l b1 ) '-ii· whereas that for Candidate 2
Notice fur ther that in this exampl e  1..i1 F '-i and
is  1..;w( "  l b1 ) = 1..;2 •
1 1 1..22 F 1..2 • Hence 
after a whil e  in thi s  regime ,  voters f ind that thei r  bel iefs are not 
conf irmed , and candidates f ind that the distribut ions of their winning 
pos i tions is different from the di stribut i on of their adopted 
pos i ti ons. Thus , the next round, voters adopt the new bel iefs .  
y2 = ( A.i1 .;i..�2 > .  and candidates  adopt new strategi es A.2 = <'-ii·'-�2 ) ,  as
il lustrated in Figure 2b. As before ,  voters adopt opt imal vot ing 
s trategies  b2 = ( bi ,b; ,b; ) .  which are l isted in the accompany ing
tab l e .  
As the above proce ss proceeds . we note that the distribut i on 
of candidate posi t ions converge s to a distribut i on which i s  a point 
mass  at the ide al point of the medi an voter . See Figure s  ( 2b ) - ( 2d ) . 
In accordance with Theorem 2 ,  thi s  i s  the only distribution which is 
stabl e--in the sense that when al l individual s act on it, it i s  
ful filled .  
I t  i s  worth noting the Darw inian nature of our dynamic mode l .  
The candidates adopt mixed strategie s  based on their current 
informat i on with regard to the best winning strategie s .  The variance 
in pol icy po s i t ions prov ided by the se mixed strategi e s  suppl i e s  the 
raw material ( the "gene pool" )  for the second stage-- i . e., the natural 
select ion which is performed by the el ection .  Thi s  second stage 
selects and preserves only winning candidates .  which then yields a new 
pool ( due to the opt imiz ing behavior of candidates  for the next 
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round. )
5. Experiments  
Thi s  section de scr ibe s a ser i e s  of  experiment s de signed to 
inve stiga te the role of informat i on in elections as modeled by the 
preceeding theoret i cal devel opment. Whil e  that theory is 1 imited 
pre sently to a one dimens i onal pol icy spac e ,  these experiment s expl ore 
the pos s ib i l i ty of a mul t idimensional extensi on by considering both 
one and two dimensional s i tua ti ons . We report on el even !-dimensional 
and three 2-dimensional experiment s ,  in which we use student s f rom 
Carnegie-Mel lon Univer s i ty and Cal ifornia  Insti tute of Technol ogy as 
subj e ct s .  The instruct ions read t o  the subj ect s of our experiment s 
are presented in Appendix B.
Each experiment involves from 5 to 21 subj ect s .  Two subj ect s 
are randomly sel ected and assigned the rol e of "candidates" ,  whi l e  the 
remaining subj ect s  are designated "voters " .  Each voter is given a 
payof f chart de pict ing his or her monetary payof f as a function of the 
pos i t ion adopted by the winning candidate . For a one dimensional 
experiment , the payoff function i s  single peaked ,  and a typical 
example i s  i l lus trated in Appendix B .  The payof f charts are private 
informat ion ,  and subj ects are not permi tted to reveal their chart to 
anyone el se . Dif ferent voters are assigned different ideal points so 
that candidates do not know the payoff functions of any of the voter s .  
Nor do  they know the distribut ion of  ideal point s .  Al so , voters and 
candi date s  are told that there is a "dummy" player whose ideal point 
i s  at z ero ,  who doe s not vote, but who publ icly "endorses" the 
candida te closest to i t s  ideal point . 1 
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Each experiment consi s t s  of a sequence of trial s--represent ing 
e l ec t i ons--which take place under the l imited information condi t ions 
de scribed in the prev ious sec t i ons .  The sequence of event s in a 
specific  trial is a s  fol low s :  Firs t ,  the two candida te s select pol icy 
pos i ti ons . This  is done secretly and voters are not informed of these 
pos i tions . Second, the "endorsement" i s  announced ,  informing voters 
which candida te i s  further to the l ef t .  Third ,  the voters must vote 
for one candida te or the other , and the bal lots are col lected and 
tal l ied. At thi s  time voters and candidate s l earn the pos i t ion of the 
winning candida te and the vote margin ( the pos i t ion of the losing 
candidate i s  not made pub l i c ) . Voters then compute thei r  payoff and 
add this amount to what they might have won from prev ious trial s. 
Thi s  sequence i s  then repeated a prede termined number of t imes ,  or 
unt i l  time exp ires ( most experiment s were l imited to one hour ) ,  
whichever comes f irst . Partic ipant s are not informed before the 
experiment about the total number of tri al s to be conducted .  
Single  I s sue Experiment s .  
Figure 3 portrays  sequence s  of  outcomes in four of  the one 
dimensional exper iment s .  The se figure s  i l lustrate the sequence of 
candidate po s i tions ,  and for the three voter experiments they al so 
give the vote of each voter in each period. 
Experiment C2 is an example in which the candidates converge 
• • f? ri ;� t I 
-
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2 to the correct equi l ibrium even though there is substant ial error in 
fl ( ::: : �- " voter behavior .2 From trial 1 thru trial 8, the unendorsed candidate  � c .. ..  c ' ••• • " always wins , and the candida tes  correctly interperet thi s  a s  a s ignal � ' 0 "' ••• • t t � to move up . Fina l ly ,  in trial 9, the endorsed candidate wins, and a s  Uj m m • 111 I 
� w 
,_ 5! • • • • � I 'fr i"' .· far as the candidates  are concerned, thi s  pins down the location of z ... 
UJ a:!ID<C Cl Z 
� / � I � ,> i2 � the equi l ibrium positi on . From then on the candidates attempt to fine w � Cl .,; <(Ill .. -
� ', ffi 
1j • • • • � I �\ �m tune their pos i t i ons around the correct equil ibrium, even de spi te '° "' .,.  m .,.. '\ • • • • ,) '° substant ial error on the part of the voters ( eg .  voter 2 votes  ------l • : : : : � �-:_-:_�, r n inonmoHy in >dah 10 •wi 12) . Expodmon< CU ; , • gnnd omplo _1__ --- , N � il lustrat ing the way in which voters can learn how to use the
0 0 0 - 0 g � g � � 0 8 � • .. • 2 _.. - Nouisod A�11od � information available  to them to vote correctly . From trial 8 thru 
NOl.LISOd A:ll10d 0 
"11 � trial 16 , a l l  voters vote correct ly in every tri al . The reason voters Q) i:: � � can do thi s  i s  that by thi s  t ime, the general loca tion of the .,., .,., !-< � candidates  i s  e stabl i shed to be between, say ,  3 S  and SS . But if the 
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$ ·;,t the endorsement is al l the informati on that the voter needs to know in / 1 "" "' m <C 
--- : {:;':! .. •= • � � order to vote  correctly .. 
"' ••• • � 2 Experiment C23 i s  il lustrative of a pattern of candida te 
� I' . .. . 
0 ,, 
� , Io 2 • • • • � �----- .. behavior that occurred in several of the experiment s .  Here, the 
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 • § '� • � candida tes  real ised that the voters observe only the endorsement . so � CD 4 "'l 4 C ! '& -
� • • • • � �----- ----:__--:=-.== "' they s imply fought to rece ive or avoid rece iving the endorsement . :f � + 0 1j 
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-
Thi s  led to qui te unstabl e behav ior unt i l  the candi da tes l earned that 
'f <I CC C e---=: 
1 
....-/� �J.. devel opment of a reputation i s  important s ince the voters woul d puni sh ' 
---�-- • •• • 
,. •-� l
• extremist candida tes in subsequent el ections . Final ly ,  Experiment CTI 
.............. , 
N <C m c C "I 
' --- -
N 
� :.: iii � :;: o : : : • � 2 iii � - -; � i s  an experiment in which one of the candida tes ( candida te B) seems 
NOl.LISOd A'.>110idl NOlllSOd AOl10d 
q�i te slow to respond to the per s i stent signals to move up .  Thus 
Candidate A is ab le  to run up a l ong' series of victorie s  by himse l f  
slowly mov ing i n  the direc t ion the voters are urging . 
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In l ieu of reviewing al l eleven experiment s in such deta i l ,  we 
prov ide a more compact summary by first looking at the voter behav ior, 
and then at candidate behav ior. 
Voters 
We first assess the ext ent to which the voter s act as if they 
have complete informat i on .  We consider al l nonini ti al trial s of al l 
one dimens ional experiment s in which the candidates  adopt dist inct 
pos i tions . Vot ing is consi stent with a perfectly informed choice 82% 
of the time . Furthermore ,  thi s  correspondence rises  from 7 6 %  in the 
first f ive tri al s to 83% in the last f ive .  ( See Row 1 of  Table  1 ) .  
I t  appears, then, that vot ing becomes more informed a s  the experiment 
progresse s .  Minimal ly, we can rej ect the hypothe s i s  that subj ects  are 
choosing randomly. 
Of course , it is unrea sonable  to expect voters to act as if 
they are comple tely informed, since whether or not they vote correc tly 
is affected by strategic choice s  of the candidate s .  Thus , if the 
candidates err, and do not choose in accordance with the information 
they pose s s ,  we cannot expect subj ects  to vote as i f  they are 
informed. Further, we woul d only expect voters to vote in a 
compl e tely informed manner once a REE in candidate strategies  i s  
reached . On the path to equilibrium , while partic ipant s are st i l l  
Full Infonnation 
Partial Infonnation 
Model I (J=l) 
Partial Information 
Hodel II Cr=4 . 16) 
Total n 
All Trials 
(except first) 
. 82 
.85 
.85 
-
0314) 
0363) 
0350) 
(1597) 
Table l 
First 5 
Trials 
.76 ( 217) .84 
.80 (227) .88 
.78 (221) .88 
(284) 
Percentage Correct Votes under 
Assumption of Full and.Partial Infonnation 
First 5 Trials Last 5 
Trials 11-15 Trials 
CONST 11.5(11.3) 1.67(6.01) 2.63(4.15) 
* * * MED .69 (.177) .950 (.094) .908 (.065) 
SE 20.l:j:� 10.6* 7 .35:j: 
R2 .22 .66 .78 
Table 2 
Trials 
11-15 
(316) 
(324) 
C324) 
( 370) 
Regression Estimates for Winning Candidate Positions 
(S tandard Errors in Parentheses) 
* indicates coefficient significant at level .05
:j: indicates rej ection of H0:(a,B) = (50,0) at level .05 
:j:t indicates rej ection of H0:(a,B) = (O,l) at level .05
30 
Last 5 
Trials 
.83 (300) 
.87 (310) 
.87 (311) 
(360) 
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l earning , we woul d expect behavior more  l ike that in Sect ion 4. We 
therefore invest igate the degr ee to which the voting is correct given 
a l earning model as de scribed in Sect ion 4.
Speci f ical ly, we assume that voters perform a regression on 
the pa st pos i t ions of the winning candida tes  in order to formul ate 
the ir  bel iefs of the l ikely posit ions at time t. Voters a ssume both 
candidates  w i l l  adopt strategi e s  drawn from thi s  predicted 
distribut ion .  
W e  l e t  z . represent the pos i t ion o f  the w inning candida te in J 
period j .  In period t ,  the voters have observed z .  for j < t ,  and we J 
assume they use the mode l . 
Zj=µt + uj ' 
where the u . are as sumed mul t ivariate normal w ith J 
E(u . ) = 0 J 
0 if j # I 
E(ujul) = 2 if j = lwt-j crt 
(5.1) 
( 5.2) 
where at ) 0, wj ) 1 for al l t , j .  We will  d i scuss a ssumptions on the
w. below. (Thus ,  the disturbance s  are assumed heteroskeda st i c ,  with J 
different weight  given to different observations ) .  Est imating thi s 
mode l ,  for f ixed r ,  yields est imate s of the candida te di stribut i ons ,  
for period t ,  of 
t 
Y1 
t A A2 
Y2 - N(µt , crt) • 
A A 
where µt and at are the OLS e st imate s  of µt and at in (5.3). As 
( 5.3) 
di scus sed in the prev ious sections , we then as sume that voters choose 
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bt e B(yt ) .  S ince the y� are symmetri c ,  Lemma 3 of Appendix A can be
appl ied to give the predic t ion that for each t, and a l l  ai e N, 
* A t y i < ut => b i (k) = k
* A t -
Yi > ut => b i (k )  = k .
In the data analysi s  that fol l ows ,  we report how wel l the 
(5.4) 
above model predict s  individual vot ing behav ior . We consider thi s 
model with two different assumpt ions on the form of the wj : 
Model 1: w . = 1 for j i J, wj = "' for j > J.J 
w. = rj
(5.5) 
Model 2 : for some r > 1.J 
So Model 1 assumes that the prev ious J periods enter into the 
regres s s ions w i th equal we ight ,  and al l periods previous to t - J are 
di scarded .  I. e., µt i s  est imated as a J period mov ing average of
winning pos i t ions in the prev ious J periods . Model 2 assumes that al l 
prev ious periods enter into the estimati on ,  but that more recent da ta 
is given more weight ( i . e . , has l e s s  variance ) than older da ta . 
We pick J in Mode l 1 and r in Model 2 to maximize the number 
of correctly predi cted votes . Using these mode l s ,  the number of 
correct predi ctions is g iven in the second two rows of Table  1. As 
can be seen, both model s  are e ssent ia l ly equivalent in term s  of their 
abi l ity to predict vote s .  About 85% of al l the votes cast are correct 
under both model s ,  with thi s  proportion rising to about 87-88% for the 
latter trial s .  
The second feature of the se estimates i s  that for both Hodel 1
and llodel 2, we see that voters tend to di s card old da ta fai rly 
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quickly. The best fitting J for Model 1 yields J = 1 ,  which impl i e s  
that voters i gnore al l da ta except the last trial . Simil arly in  Model 
2 ,  the opt imal value of r is 18 . 9  implying that da ta from period t - 2 
is assigned a standard deviation .,/18 . 9  = 4 . 16 that of  period t - 1 ,  
implying that i t  is weighted only .23 as heavily as da ta from period 
A 
t - 1 in computing µt •
We conclude that vo ters do not choose randomly, but use the
l imited informati on avai l ab l e  to them to make understandable choic e s ,  
and l earn how to use this informati on be tte r  a s  the experiment 
proceeds . Fur ther ,  there is some evidence to support the type of 
learning model postulated in Sect ion 4--namely that voters use pa st 
winning pos i t ions to predict future candida te pos i t i ons . However the 
evidence sugge sts that this l earning model is not nearly as static as 
is assumed in Section 4 .  Rather, voters put much more weight on 
recent data than on pa st da ta . Thus, they perhaps attempt to take 
into account and ant icipate the candidate l earning which is taking 
place simul taneously to the voter learning . Thi s  may explain why the 
experiment s converge towards a REE faster than would be expected under 
the dynamic story presented in Sect ion 4 . 
Cand idates 
Under ful l informat i on , we woul d expect candida tes to converge 
to the ide al point of the medi an voter . To evaluate thi s  predi ct ion, 
the po s i t ion of the median voter varies across experiment s ,  which 
pernits us to compare the candidate s '  strategies against the true 
34 
median voter ide al point . Figure 4 summarizes  the strategies  of 
winning candida tes across al l eleven one dimensional experiment s .  
Figure 4 c  plots the final f ive trial s o f  each experiment , and shows 
that the ac tual  outcomes are close ly scattered around the predicted 
outcomes .  For purpose s of compari son, Figures  4 a and 4b , which graph 
outcome s  for the first f ive trial s and Tri al s  11 through 15, show the 
convergence to the predicted outcomes that occurs as the experiment s 
proceed .  
Tabl e  2 pre sents the result s  of  the simpl e regress ions 
corresponding to Figure 4 . 
* 
We wri te MEDm for the actual median , y • 
in experiment m, and zmt for the winning candida te ' s  strategy ,  in 
period t of experiment m. We then e st imate 
zmt = a + jHIEDm + umt .  ( 5. 6 )
A s  the se regressions show , i n  every case , w e  can rej ect the hypothes i s  
of  no  association ( a  = 50 , p 0 ) ,  but in only the first f ive  periods 
do we rej ect the hypothe s i s  that the informati on is extracted 
( a = o , p  = 1 ) . The theoretical predict i on that a =  0 and p = 1 is
more closely approximated in the latter trial s ,  where r2 and the t-
statistics on a and p improve cons ide rably . The standard error around 
the regre ssion--an indication of how tightly the candida tes have 
converged�decreases from the first f ive trial s to the latter trial s .  
Figure 4 and Tabl e  2 present the data only on  winning 
candida tes ,  so this measures how wel l the candidates and voters 
extrac t the ful l information. If we perform the same regressions as 
above using data for both the winning and l o sing candidat e s ,  we obtain 
w :E 0 
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the re sul t s  presented in Tabl e  3 a .  Here ,  we see that the fit is worse 
in all ca ses than in Table 2 ,  but the same general qual itative 
conclusion hol ds . We always rej ect the hypothes i s  of no effect ,  with 
tighter fits  as t ime increase s .  However, note that we a l so rej ect the 
hypothes i s  that p = l ,  so the candida tes themselves do not extract as 
much informat i on as is extracted by the combination of candida t e
strategi e s  and voter behav ior .
As w i th voters ,  we do not expect candidates to behave as if 
they have complete informat ion for two reasons .  First, if voters make 
error s ,  we would expect these errors to be compounded in voter 
behav ior . Secondly , we do not expect perfectly informed behav ior 
unt il a l l  information is extracted. Rather , we expect a l earning 
model as de scribed in Section 4 . We can test whether candidates 
behave according to such a l earning model by assuming that they update 
their bel iefs of the optimal strategies  for time t in the same way 
that voters update thei r  bel iefs .  They thus obtain est imates 
A� - N(�t '�� ) for the opt imal strategies at time t ,  and we woul d
expect their actual strategy choice s in period t to be distributed 
A A 
about µt . We wri te 110Dlmt and /.IOD2mt for the est imate µ in period t
of experiment m according to model 1 and 2 re spect ively. We then 
est imate the fol lowing model on al l candida tes { winning and l osing) : 
zmt = a + JHlEDmt + l]MOD2mt + umt ( 5 . 7 )  
Because of the high col inearity between MODl and MOD2 , we enter only
the latte r .  Re sul ts for Mode l 1 are qui te  similar.
37 
The resul ts of estimating (5 .7 )  are pre sented in Tabl e  3b . As 
we s e e ,  the fit is conside rably better than the bivariate model of 
Table 3a in a l l  case s .  Further ,  the vari ab l e  MOD2 is always 
significant , and much of the apparent effect of MED in Tabl e  3 a  is 
captured by MOD2 when i t  is entered in the equat ion. MED i s  only 
signif icant in Tri al s  11-15. As before the standard error drops as  
l earning progre sses ,  with MOD2 seemingly becom ing stronger with time . 
Fina l ly ,  note that whil e  MED i s  not signif icant in Trials 2-6 or the 
last 5 trial s ,  tha t  the coefficient is always  posi tive .  The 
candidate s '  pos i t ion seems to be almost a convex combination of MOD2 
and MED, with MOD2 receiving most of the weight. This suggests that 
there may be some misspe c i f ication in the l earning mode l ,  and that 
candidates converge to the medi an voter faster than pr edicted by MOD2 . 
( I t  should be noted that these conclusions st i l l  hold when MODl is 
entered in the above equations ) .  
We conclude that candidates ,  l ike voters, do a reasonable j ob 
of extract ing the information availabl e ,  converging qui te rapidly 
towards strategi e s  centered near the median voter .  As with voters , we 
see that l e arning take s place faster than sugge sted by the dynamic  of 
Section 4 . Fur ther there is some ev idence that the candida te learning 
is faster than voter l earning . 
Two Dimensional Experiments 
Whil e  our the oret ical model is l imited to one-dimensional 
cont e s t s ,  it is impor tant to ascertain experimental ly whether a 
First 5 Trials Last 5 
Trials 11-15 Trials 
CONST 2 2 . 6  (9 . 47) 8. 42 (5 . 44)  5 . 74 ( 3 . 32) 
MED . 444 ( . 14 7)  • 820 ( . 0 85 )  . 85 3 ( . 05 2 )  
S E  23 . 7  1 3 . 6  8 . 31 
R2 . 0 7  I . 46 I • 72 
(a) 
First 5 Trials Last 5 
Trials 11-15 Trial s 
CONST 12 . 9 ( 8 . 48) 4 . 19 (4 . 9 1 )  1 . 86 ( 2 . 85 )  
MED . 136 ( . 140) 
* 
• 304 ( . 12 2 )  . 19 7  ( . 106 ) 
MU2 
* 
. 595 ( . 10 3 )  
* 
. 605 ( . 113)  
* 
. 747 ( . 110) 
SE 20. 8 12 . l  6 . 9 8  
R2 .30 . 5 8  I . 80 
--
(b ) 
Tab le 3 
Regression Estimates for All Candidate Positions 
(S tandard Errors in parentheses)  
* coefficient significant at level . O S
3 8  
mul t i-dimensional extensi on is promising empi rica l ly .  In thi s  
section, then, w e  report briefly �n three 2-dimensi onal experiment s 
that repl icate the information condit ions of our one-dimensional 
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experiment s ,  except that candidates  must now compete over two i s sue s 
s imul taneously ( represented by a grid that varies between 0 and 100 on 
each dimension) . To induce preferences ,  voters are given two payoff 
charts ,  one for each "issue" . For a g iven pos i ti on, say ( x , y) , voters 
must compute the payoff attributable  to each i s sue ux( x )  and uy( y) ,
and add them toge ther . The payoff functions are of the form 
* 2 * 2u ( x )  = - k ( x  - x . ) , and u ( y) = - k ( y  - y. ) • So preference s over x 1 y 1 
the two dimensi onal is sue space have circular indifference curves ,  
* * 
with ide al point at  ( x i , yi) .  Hence , to guarantee the exi stence of a
maj ori ty rul e  equil ibrium point ( a  Condorcet  winner ) , i t  is sufficient 
to construct a radial ly symmetric distributi on of ideal points in the 
two-dimensional space . Candi dates ,  in each trial , again must 
simul taneously adopt pos i tions on both issue s .  Voters are suppl ied 
with two endorsement s that tel l them which candida te is to the left on 
issue x and which is to t.he left on i s sue y. This si tua ti on, then, 
might correspond to the endorsement s of two interest groups that are 
each concerned with a sing l e ,  different issue . 
A sample 2-dimensional experiment is given in Figur e 5 ,  and a 
summary of the experimental outcomes for the winning candidates  is 
given in Table 4 . Table  4 paral lels Table  2 for the I-dimensi onal 
experiment s and reveal s a not icable  convergence towards point s near 
the Condorcet  equil ibrium in l ater trial s .  The standard error of the
CONST 
MED S 
SE 
R2 
First 5 
Trials 
Trials 
11-15 
Last 5 
Trials 
20.nrz-.1)T-2i. 7(7 .60) i-s.sc6.43) 
* 1.42 (. 235) 
16. 19
.57*� 
1.48(.147) l i.24(.125) 
10.16 ,8 .60 
. 78*# L 78* 
Tab l e  4 
Regression Estimates of Candidate 
Position vs . Median Voter in Two Demensional 
Experiments (Winning Candidates Only) 
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regr e ss ion of obs erved w inning pos i ti ons , zmt ' against the actual 
issue medi an, ),fEDm, is noticeably smal ler in the last five trial s than 
in Tri al s  11-15 and in the first f ive . 
Unque stionably, subj ects  found these 2-dimensional experiments 
more chal lenging than their  I-dimensional counterpar t s .  We do not 
have any dynamic l earning model which paral lel s our analysi s of the 
one dimensional experiment . Yet ,  overal l ,  these experiment s suggest 
that voters and candidate s can funct i on with l imi ted informati on in a 
2-dimensi onal space . Somewhat surpri singly, in fact , the statist ics 
reported in Tabl e  4 are qui t e  comparab l e  to those repor ted in Tab l e  2 . 
Thus , these experiment s g ive us some conf idence that our theoret ical 
work m ight be extended t o  the more general mul t i- dimensional context . 
5. Conclusion
The preceeding theory and experiment s show that the strong 
assumpt ions about voter and candidate informat i on general ly used in 
formal model s  of elect ions are not necessary to guarante e  the 
convergence of candidates to maj ority dominant pol ic i e s .  
Our analysis  ha s  several impl ica t ions for the more traditional 
l iterature in democratic theory . It has l ong been thought that a 
nece ssary condi tion for the succe ssful operation of democratic systems 
under maj or i ty rul e  is an informed e l ectorate . If voters are 
general ly unaware of the candida te s '  pos i t ions on i s sue s or if voters 
are unabl e  to articulate their  preferenc e s  in terms of the i s sue s over 
which the elect i on is conte sted, then there seems no guarant ee that 
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"appropri ate" pol ici e s  w i l l  be choosen by candida te s  and implemented 
by winner s .  Hence , there has b e en  a general lament by pol itical 
scient i s t s  and j ournal i s t s  over the empi rical fact that c it izens come 
nowher e  near the ide al of perfect information . A second concern, 
which has yielded  numerous confrontations be tween pol iticians and the 
news media ,  is the de gree to which the media  and other "opini on 
e l i te s" affect the outcome of elect ions . TI1e concern i s  that such 
el ites are not repre sentative of the "maj ori ty" and that they exercise 
undue influence over publ ic pol icy through thei r  ab il ity to endorse 
candidates  for election ( In the case of the news media, the argument 
goe s  fur ther ,  of course ,  and concerns their  abi l i ty to present biased 
or unfair account s of candida te s . )  
Our experiment s and the theory that structures  their de sign, 
however ,  sugge st that two candidate , democratic systems can work ( in 
the sense of aggregating and responding to al l rel evant information 
about voter preferences )  even if voters have no direct knowledge of 
candida te pos i t ions and candi dates  have no direct knowledge of voter 
preference s .  Second, in equil ibrium , interest groups need not affect 
pol icy out comes .  The voters use endorsements to gather information, 
but in equil ibrium that is the only rol e such endorsement s play 
insofar as candidates converge to the ful l information equi l ibrium-­
the medi an electoral preference . 
The l imitat ions of these resul ts ,  however ,  warrant emphas i s .  
First , the attainment of an equi l ibrium supposes a sequence of 
e lect ions in which voter preferences and the identi ty of the 
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candidates are constant . Second, our theoretical model is l imited so 
far to one dimensi onal cont e s t s .  Third, we do not consider other 
aspec t s  of a c i tizen ' s cal culus , including the dec i s ion whether to 
vote or to abstain. Fourth, interest groups in our model are simply 
passive agents who do not attempt to influence the candidate s directly 
( for example through campa ign contribut i ons or endorsement s that are 
cont ingent on pol icy conce ssions ) . Each of these l imitations can, in 
principal , be addressed, and in future research we w i l l  attempt to do 
so . 
El sewhere ,  we develop a single period election model that 
rel ie s  on publ ic opinion pol l s  instead of histor ical da ta as an 
information source for the uninformed voters [McKelvey and Orde shook, 
1 984 a ,b ] . We establ ish condi t ions in that model under which such 
pol l s  are suf fici ent to induce ful l informat ion equi l ibria .  It shoul d 
be pointed out that both the mode l devel oped here and the one 
developed in [ 1 984a , b ]  are bare bone s mode l s ,  in which the information 
source for al l voters i s  very l imited. However, any more real is t ic  
model would have voters obtaining information from several different 
source s -- for exampl e pol l s ,  interest group endorsement s and the 
histori cal record. Perhaps different voters woul d obtain informat ion 
from different source s .  We would expect that in any such model the 
different informations source s woul d reinforce each other to increase 
the robustness of democr atic inst i tutions under incompl ete 
information. 
A rat ional expectations approach , then, may sharply al ter the 
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way we view the relationship between pol itical atti tude s and voting . 
As dist inct from the research that document s c i t izen ignorance about 
the pol icy pos i tions of candidates on specific  i s sue s ,  we conclude 
that precise knowledge may not be required for voters to cast a 
correct vote , or for candidat e s  to converge to the median voter .  Al l 
that is required i s  an appropr i ate se t of endogenous variabl e s  which 
voters can use to make inference s about candidate positions . In thi s  
paper w e  have shown that in  the context of repeated el ect ions, 
historical data toge ther with contemporaneous endorsement data is 
sufficient . 
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F001NOTES 
1 .  Actual ly ,  two endorsement s are announced--one corre sponding to a 
group with its ide al point at 0 and the other with i t s  ideal 
point at 10--al though only one is requi red theoretical ly since 
these endorsement s are in general redundant . Two groups are 
included, however ,  in ant icipat ion of some future experiment s .  
2 . By "err" w e  mean the voter votes  incorrectly given compl ete
information ( which the voter doe s  not have ) .  However the voter
" errors" discus sed here are al so errors according to the weaker
test--that the voter votes  for the be st candidate given a
reasonab l e  proj ect ion of the l ikely candidate pos i tions . See
( 5.4 ) be low .
Append ix A 
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Thi s  appendix contains proofs of the proposi tion and theorems 
of Sect ion 3 .  The notation in thi s  appendix fol l ows that of Sect ion 
3 .  Before proving these resul ts, we g ive some prel iminary de fini t ions 
and round up a herd of l emmas .  
For any A £  S ,  and k & K ,  we l e t  nk(A) = {x&Sk l x  = sk for some 
seS } be the proj ect ion of A on dimension k. For k & K0 , we l e t  
� = { s eS l e ( s )  = k }  be the set o f  strategy pairs where candidate k i s  
endorsed, and for b & B, Wk( b )  = { s &S (w( s , b )  = k }  be the set of 
strategies where candida te k wins. G iven A =  ( A1 , A2 l e A. we def ine
some derived probab i l i ty measures .  For each k e K and j e K0 , def ine 
the probabi l i ty measures  Akj as fol l ows : For C e ID ,
-1 I �j (C )  = A (nk ( C )  Ej ) = 
-1 A ( nk ( C )  0 E . )
A (E . ) J 
( Al )  
S o  �j repre sents the di stribut i on of k ' s posi tions when he is 
endorsed. We al so def ine , for any b & B, the measure �w( " ( b )  by , for 
all  C & ID ,
1 -1 0 Wk(b ) )  r -1 � A ( nk ( C )  
A (Wk(b ) )  
+ zA(nk ( C )  n w0 Cb» 
+ tA (W0 (b ) )
if A (W_(b ) )  F 1
k 
l otherwise ( A2 )  
So Akw represents the distribut ion o f  k ' s  pos i t ions when h e  wins the 
elect ion--except if k never wins, then Akw is de f ined as the 
distribut ion of k ' s  winning positions . Not e  that in de fining 
Akwc · lb ) , we must take account of the possib i l i ty that k wins outright
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as wel l as the probab i l i ty that k wins the coin toss when there i s  a 
t i e .  Given A. e A. and b e  B, we l e t  A.w( · ( b )  denote the overal l 
distribut i on of winning posi tions .  So for C e 1B ,
A.w( C (b )  
k
� �w( C ( b ) [ A. ( Wk(b ) )  + }1.<Wo ( b ) ) ]
} [ A. C rr�1 <c> n Wk(b ) ) + }1. crr�1 <c > n w0 C b l ) l  k'&K 
( A3 )  
Lemma ! If ( A.
*
, b
*
) e AX B characterizes a REE, then i t  satisfies  the
fol lowing condi t ions 
( a )  
(b )  
( c )  
* * For all  ai e N and al l j e K, al l k e K0 with A. (Ek) > 0 , b i
satisfies 
* 
m A. [u . ( x ) ]  > m * [u . ( x ) ]j k  1 A._ 1 
jk 
* 
=> b .  (k )1 
* 
w( s , b  ) * is constant for A. a . e .  s e S .
j .  
For each k e K0 , i f  1..
*
(Ek) > 
0 , then 3 ai e N for which
* E ,  [u . ( x ) ]  11.lk 1 
* 
1E ,  [u . ( x ) ] .ll.2k 1 
Proof 
( a )  Note that w( s , b )  depends on s only through the dependence of b on 
s. Hence we wri te w( s , b ) = w(b ( e ( s ) ) . Then, by ( VI ) . 
But 
* * b . & arg max lE * [M . ( s , b l b . ) ]l * /... l 1 
b . eF 
l 
for al l b & �.
*lE * [Mi ( s , b lb i ) ]  = E * [ui ( s  * ) ]
A. A. w[ (b (b . ) ( e ( s ) ) ]  1 
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f f u . ( s  * dA.* ( s ) ( Al )  
k�0 Ek 1 C w<b lb i ) (k ) ) 
* 
so we maximiz e (Al )  by pi cking b i so that for each 
k e K0 , with
* 
A. ( Ek) > 
0 , then
* s 
* 
b . (k )  & arg max u . ( s  * ) dA. ( s )1 
b: (k ) eK
O 
Ek i w(b ( b i ) (k )  
( A2 )  
but since w is monotonic ,  and ( A2 )  must hold for al l b e B ,  this i s  
* 
equival ent to, for al l k e K0 , with A. ( Ek) > 
0
or 
* 
b .  (k )  & 
1 
arg max
* 
b i (k )  eK0 
f u . ( s  * ) dA.* ( s )� 1 bi (k ) 
* s 
* 
b . (k )  e arg max u . ( s . ) dA. ( s )
i . K E 1 J J & 0 k 
but for j e K, 
f ui ( sj ) dA.* ( s )  = f ui ( sj > [f dA.�( s�) ] dA.; ( sj )Ek s .  SE J J 
S 
* J k 
= u . ( x ) dA. .k ( x )  = 1E ,  * [u . ( x ) ]  1 J 11.jk 1 
so the resul t fol lows. 
* 
( b )  We wri te w ( s , b  ) 
* 
w(b ( e ( s ) ) ,  and for any k e K0 , write
w = k 
* 
* 
w(b (k ) ) . Al so, we write Ek = { s ( e ( s )  = k }  for k e K0 •
* 
s e Ek => w ( s , b  ) = wk 
Thus , 
I f  A. (Ek) = 1 for any k e K0 , then the re sul t fol lows trivial ly, so we 
* * 
assume that A. (Ek) < 1. But by the assumptions on A. A. C E0 ) = 0 or
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* * * 
A ( E0 ) = 1 ,  hence we have A ( E0 ) 0 and 0 < A (Ek) < 1 for al l k e K.
We now have two case s: 
Case ! wk F 0 for any k e K
Let k e K ,  and l e t  wk = j .  We then show that w - = j .  Supposek 
not .  Then wk = j and w_ = j . Now from ( Cl ) , we have ,  for al  1 C e �. 
and 
k 
* 
A . (C )J 
A:( C) 
j 
A
*
<n-:-1 <cJ n �J
* 
A ( Ek)
A
*
<n:::1 ( C )  0 E_)
j k 
• 
A CE_)
k 
.. .. 
• 
Ajk(C )  
A.:_( c ) 
jk 
By Lemma 2 ,  i t  fol lows that A. and A J are both degenerate point j 
.. 
dens i ties ,  imply ing that A ( { s } )  1 for some s B S .  But this 
.. .. 
contradic t s  the fact that A (E0 ) 0 and A (Ek) > 
0 for al l k e K .  
* * 
Hence we must have wk = w_ k
.. 
So, since A ( Ek U E_) = 1 - A ( E0 ) = l ,
k 
* 
i t  fol lows that w( s , b  ) wk for A a . e .  s e S .  
Case � wk = 0 for some k e K.
Let wk = 
0 , and l e t  k e K - {k} . We wi l l  show that w_ = 0 .
k 
Assume w_ F 0 , say w_ = j e K .  and let j e K - { j } . Then from ( Cl) . 
k k. 
we have ,  for all C e �.
* 
J. . (C )  J 
* -1 1 -1 }. ( 7! .  ( C )  n E )  + -2 ( 7! .  ( C )  n Ek) J k J 
* 1 * I. (E_) + 2}. (Ek)
k 
* -1 1 * -1 
A ( n .  ( C ) ) - 2A ( n .  ( C) 0 �)
1 * 
1 - 2A ( Ek)
* * * 
2A . ( C) - A ( E ) A .k( C )
* 
2 - A ( Ek)
* 
Solving this for A . ( C )  yiel dsJ 
* 
A . (C )J 
* 
Ajk(C ) .
Also applying (Cl )  we have .  for all  C B � • 
A:(C )  
j 
A
*
<n:::1 ( C )  0 �) 
j 
* 
A (Ek)
• * 
A: ( C ) . 
jk  
By Lemma 2 ,  it fol l ows that A .  and A are  both degenerate point J -;-J 
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dens i t i e s .  A s  in Case l ,  this y ie lds a contradict ion, unl e s s  w_ = 0 .
k 
* 
But then w ( s , b  )
.. 0 for A a . e .  s e S .  
.. 
( c )  I f  A ( E0 ) = 1 ,  then the resul t is triv ial , so we assume 
.. 
A ( E0 ) = O. There are 2 case s .
Case ! w( s , b
*
) = k F 0 for A
* 
a . e .  s e S .  I n  this ca se , i t  fol lows 
.. * * * * * 
from ( C l )  that Al = A2 •
Hence Al l = A22 and A12 = A21 . From Lemma l a  
* * * -
i t  fol lows that if b i ( l) F 
0 , then b i ( l) = j => bi ( 2) = j .  So
* * - * 
b ( 1 )  = k => b ( 2) = k , a contradict ion unl ess b . ( l) = 0 for some1 
ai e N .  But then, for this i ,  by Lemma l a , we have that 
lE * [ui ( x ) ] =  lE * [ui ( x ) ] .Al l  J.21 
A similar argument shows that b: ( 2 )  = 0 for some a.  e N, from which it 
1 1 
fol lows that 1E * [ui ( x ) ]
}.12 
lE * [u . ( x ) ]  for some a .  e N.
}. 1 1 22 
* * 
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Case I w( s , b  ) = 0 for A a . e .  s e S. In this case let k & K satisfy 
* * ' A (Ek) > 0 , and assume bi (k )  # 0 for al l ai & N. Then since there are 
* * 
an odd number of voters , we must have v1 ( s ,b ) # v2 ( s ,b ) for any
* 
s & Ek. But then w ( s , b  ) # 0 for s e Ek' a contradict i on. So we must 
* 
have b . (k) = 0 for some a .  e N .  1 1 But thi s  impl ies ,  by Lemma l a ,  that
E * [ui { x ) ]
A.lk 
E * [ui ( x ) ] .
A2k 
Q .E .D. 
For the next l emma , we need to  define the not ion of stochastic 
dominance .  For any c & JR ,  we de fine Lc = { t  e JR. I t i c l .  Given two 
measure s  A, µ on the Borel se ts of lR ,  we say that A (weakly) 
st ochast ically dominate s  µ, wr itten µ i A i f f  µ (Lc) 2 A. (Lc ) for al l 
c e JR .  We say A ( s trongly) stochas t ical ly dominates µ ,  written 
µ -< A. iff µ � A and it is not the case 'that A i  µ. Thus , A. weakly 
stocha stica l ly dom inates µ whenever i t s  cumul ative density function is 
always l e ss than or equal to that of µ .  For strong domina tion, the 
two c . d . f . ' s  cannot be equal . 
Lemma I For each k & K, Akk -< � -< A. _ whenever al l measur es arekk 
* * 
defined, unl ess A.k( { t } )  1 for some t e JR .  Fur ther , for each 
k & K ,  A.kk -< A._ whenever both measure s  are def ined .kk 
Proof :  For k & K, and t e JR ,  l e t  Fk( t ) = A.k( Lt ) be the cumul at ive 
densi ty funct i on of A.k . Then from the def ini tion of �j ' for any
C e ID • we have 
and 
A _( C) 
kk 
A(i > Sc F_C t l d�< t >
k k 
Akk(C )  = A(� )fc
< l  - F_( t ) ) dAk( t ) .
k k 
Now, since F_( t )  i s  a monotonic increasing funct i on of t and
k 
( 1  - F_( t ) )  is a monot onic decreasing funct ion of t ,  the resul t that
k 
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�k -< � -< A _ fol lows directly from Lemma 3 .2 of McKelvey and Pagekk 
[ 1 984 ] . 
and 
To see that A.kk -< A._ , we note that ,  for c e JR ,kk 
A. < L  > = _
1 _ _ S
c 
kk 
c A. (Ek) -
m Fk( t ) dA_( t )k 
1 
S
c 
A.kk( Lc ) = A. CE ) -m 
( 1  - F_( t ) ) d�( t )
k k 
But . writing f . ( t )  for the density function of A . , we can integrate byJ J 
parts to  obtain 
s:m( l  - F_( t ) ) d�( t )  = Fk( c )  - s:m F_( t ) fk( t ) d tk k 
Hence 
Fk ( c ) [ l  - F_( c ) ]  + s:mf_( t )Fk ( t ) dt
k k 
2 s:m Fk( t ) dA_( t )k 
Akk( Lc) = A(i ) s:m(
l  - F_( t ) ) dA.k( t )
k k 
l A(! ) s:m 
Fk( t ) dA_( t )
k k 
A. ( L  ) 
kk 
c 
which proves l..kk -< I.._ 
kk
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Q .E.D .  
We let AS � A  be the set of measures sati sfying , for all  
I.. = ( "'1 , "'2 ) & A, 
( a )  "'1 = "'2 
(b ) 
* *
1..k i s  symmetric about t for some t s JR i . e .  �(Lt) 
* = 1 - J..k ( L * ) for al l t & JR • 
2 t  -t 
Lemma 2_ Let u :X -7 :m. be symmetri c  and single  peaked ,  with ideal 
point at 0 ,  and l e t  I.. = C A.1 , A.2 ) s A
s . with I.. not degenerate . For 
k & K, define ek :X -7 JR by 
" ( y) = lE [u (x-y) ] - E [u ( x-y) ]k A._ "'kk 
kk 
* 
Then ek( y) has exactly one root at y = x , where x 
* * 
* 
Further y ( x -7 "k( y) > 0 and y > x -7 "k{ y) ( o .  
= EA. { x )1 
Proof :  We l e t  f1 and f2 be the densi ty functions o f  1..1 and 1..2 
E:i.. ( x ) .2 
re spec t ively. Since A.1 
= A.2 , these densi ty funct ions are ident ical , 
so we can wri te f = f1 = f2 • We let g1 and g2 be the densi ty 
func tions for I.._ and �k ' ( Note that since 1..1 kk 
1..2 , we have
A.11 = 1..22 and 1..12 = 1..21 > . Let F (x )  = J�.,f ( t ) dt and Gj ( x )  = J�.,g ( t ) dt 
be the corresponding cumul at ive densi ty functions . Then, wri ting u '  
for the first derivative of  u ,  
ek < y> E [u (x-y) ] - 1E [u (x-y) ]I.._ l..kk 
kk 
= f u (x-y) [ g1 ( x )  - g2 ( x) ] dx 
f u ' ( x-y) [ G2 ( x )  - G1 ( x ) ] dx 
(The last step fol l ows from integrat ion by par ts ) . We write 
�(x) = G2 ( x )  - G1 ( x ) . Then we can write G2 and G1 as 
G2 ( y) = f�.,[ l  - F1 ( t ) ] f2 ( t ) dt
G1 ( y) = f�.,F2 ( t ) f1 ( t ) dt 
and then, using the fact that F1 
= F2 = F ,  and f1 
f ( x )  = G2 ( x )  - G1 ( x )  = f�.,[ l  - 2F ( t ) ] f ( t ) d t .  
f2 f ,  we get 
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Now from Lemma 2 ,  it fol lows that A._ >- l..kk ' so G2 { x )  - G1 ( x )  2. 0 forkk 
al l x .  Hence f (x )  is nonnegative . Next , using the symmetry of f ( t )  
about x
*
, and the fact that F{x
*
) = t •  it fol lows easily that f ( x )  is
* * 
symmetric  about x • I . e . , f ( x )  = f ( 2x - x) for al l x e X. Final ly ,  
since f ' ( x )  = [ l - 2F ( x ) ] f (x )  is posi tive for x < x* and nega t ive for
* 
x < x ,  i t  fol lows that f (x )  is single peaked .  Thus ,  we wri te 
ek( y) 
= f u ' ( x  - y) f ( x ) dx 
* 
where f is nonnega t ive ,  symmetric and single  peaked about x , and
where u ' { t )  = - u ' (-t )  for al l t .  But now, we can rewrite ( A3 )  as  
"k{ y) S
y u '  ( t-y) f ( t ) dt - f"'u • ( t-y) 1' ( t )dt
_., y 
- f"'u • ( y-r )f {2y-r ) dr - f"'u• ( t-y) f ( t ) dty y 
s;u• ( t-y) [f ( 2y- t )  - f( t ) ] dt
* * 
( A3 )  
S o  i f  x i y ,  then for y i t ,  w e  have 2 x  - t i 2y - t i t ,  s o ,  us ing 
the symmetry and single peakedne ss of f ,  
And if y i 
* 
x •
* 
f ( 2y-t) 2 f C 2x -t )  = fC t ) . 
* 
then for y i t ,  we have 2y - t i t i 2x 
f( t )  2 f ( 2x*-2y+t )  = f( 2y-t )
- ( 2y-t )  s o  
In  both case s ,  the se become strict inequal ities if y I x* , and are
* 
equal ities when y = x , hence . since u ' ( t-y) < 0 for y i t ,  we get 
* 
y < x => dk ( y) > 0 
* => dk( y) = 0 y = x 
* => dk( y)y > x < 0 
* 
Henc e ,  lllk has a unique root at  y = x • 
as we wished to show .
5 5  
Q .E .D .  
Proof of Proposit ion 1
* * 
That r = A fol l ows directly from (V2) and (Cl) of the 
defini tion of a REE. Then (Vl ')  and (Cl ' )  are immediate consequences 
* 
of the fact that r *A • The last assertion of the proposition 
fol l ows directly from Lemma l a .  
Proof of Theorem 1 We show that not ( a )  impl ies (b ) .  
If ( a )  does not hol d ,  then l1 = l2 • and nei ther is degenerate , 
hence l(Ek) F 0 for k e K .  
* 
For each ai e N, define vi( y) = ui( y+yi) .  
* 
So ui( x )  = vi( x-yi) .  where vi is symme tric and single  peaked about O .
Wri te 
l!ii ( y) E * [vi( x-y) ]l_ 
kk 
By Lemma 3 ,  it fol lows that 
lE * [ vi( x-y) ] 
�k 
y x
* => di ( y) ) 0 
y = x
* 
=> di( y) = 0 
* . 
y > x =) d1 ( y) < o .
5 6  
But l!ii C/l 1 E * [ui ( x ) ]  - E * [ui ( x ) J . and by Lemma l a ,  it fol lows 
lkk �k 
that 
Hence 
* 
x .  < x 1 
* 
x .  > x 
1 
l!ii ( y� ) > 0 =) b� (k )  = k1 1 
i * * -" ( yi ) < 0 =) bi (k ) = k .
* * * -
= ) b .  (k )  = k and b .  (k) = k 
1 1 
* * * -
=> b . ( k )  = k and b . (k) = k 1 1 
* * 
Since in equi l ibrium, we need w ( s , b  ) constant for A a . e .  s e S ( se e  
* * * 
Lemma lb ) ,  i t  fol lows that we need x = ym. where ym is  the medi an of 
* 
the y i .
* * 
Q .E .D .  
Proof of Theorem � Let (l  ,b ) charact erize a stable  REE. We note ,  
* 
first , from the def ini tion of stabil i ty ,  that for any b '  e Q(l  ) ,  
l
*
c · l b ' )  = l* c · lb*) ,  so ( l* ,b ' )  characteriz es  a REE. But now , def ine
w w 
* 
b '  e Q( l ) a s  fol lows 
b '. (k )
1 
* 
Clearly, b '  e �( A ) .  
* 
b . (k ) if E * ( u . ( x ) )  F E * (u . ( x ) )1 L 1 A 1 ·u 
kk 
e (k )  otherwise 
Fur ther , we have w( s , b ' )  e ( s )  for al l s e S .  
llence 
A
*
c c lb ' )w 
• • • • 
A (Ek) Akk(C )  + A ( E_) A�( C ) . 
k kk 
But , for any c e JR ,  
A
*
( L  l b ' )w c 
• • • • 
A (El ) All ( Lc) + A (E2 ) A22 ( Lc ) 
f�m( l - F2 ( x ) ) f1 { x ) dx + J�m( l - F1 ( x ) ) f2 { x ) dx
= Fl ( c )  + F2 { c )  - cf�mF2 { x ) fl ( x ) dx + S�mFl ( x ) f2 ( x ) dx]
= F1 ( c )  + F2 { c )  - F1 ( c )F2 ( c )  
1 - ( 1  - F1 ( c ) ) (
l - F2 ( c ) )  2 F1 ( c )
l F2 C c )  
with strict inequal ity when F1 ( c )  f. F2 { c )  o r  0 < Fk( c )  < 1 .  Hence 
1 1 • * and Aw -< Az but then Aw -< ZAl + zAi = A C wl b  ) . Hence 
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Aw -< Al 
A
*
c - l b ' )w 
* * * * f. Aw( " l b ) ,  a contradict i on, unl ess A1 ( { y} )  = A2 ( {y} ) = 1 for
some y & X. 
• 
We must now only show that y = y • Suppose not , assume 
• 
w. l . o . g . that  y < y 
y '  such that y < y' 
. * 
• • 
Then for any neighborhood N(Ak) of �· we pick 
. , 
y and set Ak( {y ' } )  = 1 .  Then if y' is chosen 
so that Ak & N(Ak) '  we have b' e E( A ' )  <=> 
• 
• 
< Y._2_L => b ' (k )  = k Yi 2 
• Y._2_L => b ' (k) = ky i > 2 
but since Y._2_L 2 y ,  it fol lows that w( s , b ' )  = e { s ) . 
Hence 
A' c { y' l lb ' )  = lw 
A* ( {y} l b
*
) = 1w 
• • 
so the two are not equal , hence (A , b  ) is not stabl e .  
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Final ly ,  to prove exi stence , we let (A
*
, b
*
) e AX B satisfy 
* * • • 
Ak( {y } )  = 1 .  Let N (Ak) be any neigh
borhood of Ak ' and l e t
. . , 
Ak e N(Ak) '  A
_ 
k 
A
*
, and b ' e B(A ' ) . Then we must have , for k e K , if 
k - ' 
A ' ( Ek) f. 0 ,  
• , 
Yi 2 yi => b i (k ) =
k
• , 
Yi ! Yi =) b i (
k )  = k
• 
But then w( s , b )  = k for al l s & S ,  hence Aw ' ( {y } )  
A ( " lb ' )  = A
*
C "  lb
*
> .w 
l ,  so 
Q .E .D .  
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Appendix B :  Experimental Instruct ions 
Thi s  experiment is a study of voting in two candidate 
elections .  As subj ects  in the experiment , you will each be assigned 
to  be ei ther a voter or a candida te ,  and you wi l l  each be paid for 
your participat ion in the experiment on the ba sis of the dec i s i ons you 
make . If you are careful , and make good decisions, you can make a 
substant i al amount of money . 
In thi s  experiment , there are two candida tes ,  l abeled A and B ,  
whi l e  the rest of you are voters . The experiment itse lf  wil l  consist  
of a prede termined number of tri al s .  I n  each trial the candida tes 
wil l  adopt pos i ti ons in a one dimensi onal pol icy space . Voters wi l l  
vote for the candida te they prefer, and the maj ority outcome of  thi s  
vote wil l de term ine the winning candida t e .  Voters are paid for the ir 
participation on the basis of their payof f function--to be de scribed 
in more de tail bel ow ,  and candidat e s  are paid for their participation 
on the ba sis of the total number of elections they win. 
Before de scribing the experiment in de tail , l e t  me describe 
the pol icy space and the payoff funct ion of the voter s .  
At the beginning of the experiment , voters wi l l  each b e  g iven 
a payoff chart simil ar to the sample chart in front of you. Thi s  
chart depic t s  the pol icy space and a sample payof f funct i on for a 
voter . Candida tes wil l be given a similar char t ;  however , the 
candidate chart will  only contain the pol icy space , and wi l l  not have 
� voter payoff funct ions . The "pol icy space" is simply the set of 
al l numbers between 0 and 100 , and is repre sented on the hor izontal 
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axi s in the di agram .  In each trial , candidates  wi l l  adopt pos i ti ons 
in the pol icy space . At the end of each tri al , the posi tion of the 
winning candidate will  be announced , and each voter will  be pa id for 
his or her part icipation in that tri al on the bas i s  of hi s payoff 
funct ion. Thus , with the sample payoff chart ,  if the winning 
c andidate  were to adopt the posi tion 33 , then the voter woul d earn 
$1 .25 for that trial . At the end of the experiment ,  the voter will  be 
paid, in cash, an amount equal to  the cumul at ive amount he or she has 
earned on each trial . 
In the actual experiment , the payoff charts for each of the 
voters w il l  be different from the sample chart .  Further ,  the payoff 
funct ions for different voters may also be different . Each voter will 
have a payoff function which has a peak, or ideal point at some point 
in the pol icy space , and decrease s as we move in e i ther direct i on, as 
in the example in the sample chart .  However, different voters ' ideal 
point s ,  or peaks , may be at di fferent points in the space , and they 
may decrease at different rate s .  One important rul e in the exper iment 
is that the informat ion on your payoff chart is private informat ion. 
None of the other voters or candida te s wi l l  know the information on 
your char t .  At no time should you show, talk about , or in any other 
way reveal any informat ion about your apyoff chart to other subj ect s . 
Further , at no time during the experiment are you to  have � 
communications with any of the other subj ect s  except those expl ici tly 
provided for in the rul e s .  
Are there any que stions about the payoff chart? If not ,  I 
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wil l proceed to a de script ion of the exper iment i tsel f. 
The experiment is divided into a number of "trial s , "  each one 
of which consi sts  of an elect ion. At the beginning of each trial , the 
two candidate s, A and B ,  wil l  each adopt pol icy po si tions . The 
posi tions adopted by the two candida tes wi l l  not be made publ i c .  Each 
candidate will wri te his posi tion, a number be tween 0 and 100 ,  on one 
of the cards provided ,  and hand i t  to the experimenter .  This  wil l  be 
done in secrecy .  The only information the voter will have about the 
candida tes is the interest group endorsement information. This  wil l  
require some further expl anation .  You wil l  note , on the sample payoff 
chart ,  are marked the posit ions of two interest groups .  After the two 
candi da tes have adopted their  posi tions , the experimenter will record, 
on the bl ackboard, the endorsement of each interest group. You may 
interpret  this information as fol lows .  Each interest group wil l  
endorse the candidate which is closest to the posi tion of  that 
interest group .  Thus , i f  candidate A adopted the point 33 , and 
candidate B adopted 53 , as marked on the sampl e payoff chart ,  i t  
fol l ows that interest group 1 would endorse A ( since A is cl oser to  
interest group 1 than is B ) , but interest group 2 would endorse 
candida te B .  Note that if this  were part of the experiment , and you 
were a voter ,  the only information you would have is the endorsement s 
of the two interest groups . You would know that interest group 1 
endorse s A and interest group 2 endorse s B .  You would not know that 
posi tions of e i ther candidate .  They are indicated on the di agr am 
simply to il lus trate how the inter est group endorsements are computed 
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from the candida te posi tions . 
After the candida tes have adopted their positions and the 
interest group endorsement s have been announced ,  the voters wil l  then 
vote ,  on the bal lot card prov ided for e i ther candidate A or candidate 
B .  The se votes will also be cast in secr et ,  and handed to the 
experiment . The experimenter will then tal ly the vote s  and announce 
the winning candidat e ,  and the pos i tion of the winning candidat e .  The 
trial will end a t  this point . At this  t ime , the voters should record 
the posi tion of the winning candidate on the record sheet that wil l be 
provided and compute the payoff they rece ive for that trial . We will 
thjn proceed to the next trial . After a prede termined number of 
trial s have e lapsed, the experiment wil l terminate ,  and a l l  subj ect s 
will be pa id in accordance with their payoff chart s .  Candidates wi l l  
be paid $1.00 for each elect ion they win, and nothing otherwise . 
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This Appendix contains the raw data for the experiments ,  plus 
f igures for the experiment s not contained in the body of the text . 
The raw data on the subsequent pages i s  in the fol lowing form: 
.,., 
""" 
'"O 0 
.,., 
H 
Q) 
p.. 
� � 
·rl •rl 
'"O '"O 
0 0 
.,., .,., 
H H CJ CJ 
p.. p.. ....., ....., 
>:: >:: 0 0 
.,., .,., .µ .µ 
.,., .,.; 
rJl rJl 
0 'O 
p.. 
«: P'l 
Q) CJ 
.µ .µ 
t1l t1l 
'"O '"O 
.,., .,., 
'"O '"CJ 
I § Q t1l u u 
Experiment ft 
ideal point.  voter i 
�I period i vote o f  voter j 
.,., 
H Q) p ....., 
H 
Q) 
g .,., 
" 
C7 
37 72100 
J J O  !50 A A S A 
2 9 3!5 B B B A
3 27 20 A B A A 
4 27 3!5 B B B B 
!5 BB 41 A A A A 
4 1 00 10 8 B B A 
7 1 0 0 70 A A A A 
8 40 50 A A A 8 
9 40 80 8 A B 8 
1 o 45 20 e e e A 
1 1  4!5 70 8 B B 8 
12 45 65 B A B B 
1 3  60 20 A B A A 
14 4!5 70 A A A 9 
15 4!5 70 A A A B 
14 45 JO A A A A 
17 4!5 50 B A B 8 
I 8 53 45 A B A A 
19 !53 40 A 9 A A 
20 53 60 B A 9 B 
21 53 40 A B A A 
22 55 55 A B A A 
23 55 30 A 8 A A 
24 !55 60 B A B B 
25 57 65 A A A B 
26 !57 45 A 8 A A 
27 57 40 A 8 A A 
C23 
1 0 0  BB 8 3  72 6 0  50 37 
1 47 5 A A A A A A A A 
2 59 66 9 B 8 B A A B 9 
3 7:::1 69 A A A A A 8 B 8 
4 47 85 B 9 B 9 B B 9 A 
!5 97 92 A A A A B B A A 
6 41 00 9 B A B A A 8 9 
7 13 90 A 9 A 8 A A A A 
8 1 00 70 A A A A A B B A 
9 7 1 0 0  B 9 B B B 8 A A 
1 0 9 8 1 0 0  B 8 B 9 B B A A 
1 1  4 7 1 0 0  A B A B A A A A 
12 56 I A A A A A A A 8 
1 3  59 ns 8 B B B A B A A 
1 4  60 85 B B 9 9 B A A A 
1 5  !5 1  96 8 B 9 B 8 A A A 
1 6  701 0 0  A B A 9 A 9 A A 
J 7 66 2 2  A A A A A A B 9 
I e 54 75 A B 9 e A A A A 
1 9  !55 75 B 9 B 9 B B A A 
20 77 80 A 9 B 8 A A A A 
2 1  64 61 A A A A A B 9 8 
22 6!5 75 A B 9 B A A A A 
23 60 55 A A A A A 9 8 B 
24 63 75 B B B B B B A A 
25 70 75 S B B B B A A A
26 68 75 B B 8 B 8 A A A 
27 76 n.1 8 A A A B B B B 
28 77 75 8 A A A e A B e 
CTl 
Cl2 
I 0 0  83 60 
1 63 15 A A A A 
2 25 34 B B B B 
3 99 2 A A A A
4 40 59 A B A A 
3 1 47 B B B B 
6 76 42 A A A A 
7 50 67 B B 9 A 
B 69 58 A A A B 
9 1 00 !:53 A A A B 
1 0  55 25 A A A B 
1 1  81 79 A A A A 
12 95100 B 8 A B 
1 3  BS 95 A A A B 
1 4  99 69 A A A 8 
1 5 1 00 74 A A A B 
1 6  0 74 A B A A 
1 7  83100 8 B B B 
1 Bl 00 49 B A B B 
1 9 55 68 8  B B B
20 99 75 8 A B B 
2 1  78 60 B A B B 
22 95 BO A A A B 
23 76 75 9 A B S 
24 BB 70 B A B B 
25 74 83 B B B B 
26 91 77 B A B B 
27 55 79 B B B 8 
29 69 75 8 B A B 
29100 70 A A A B 
30 76 70 9 A B B 
31 90 77 8 A S B 
32 77 75 8 8 B B
C20 
1 8  37 60 
1 B0 5 A B A A
2 63 40 S B B A 
3 50 30 B B B S
4 40 45 B B B B 
5 10 50 S A B B 
6 70 45 B B B A 
7 BO !:55 B B 9 A 
8 60 50 9 B B A
9 50 50 A A 8 A
1 0 50 40 A A B A
1 1 50 55 B B A B
1 2  50 55 A A A B 
J 3 50 40 B B 8 A 
1 4  M 42 B B B A 
1 5  47 44 A B A A 
I 6 45 50 8 A 8 8 
1 7 47 42 A A B A 
1 8  48 eii2 A A 8 A 
1 9  47 46 S 8 8 A 
20 46 47 A A A 8 
21 4!:5 50 A A A 8 
2 2  44 40 8 8 B A 
23 40 30 B 8 B A 
24 38 3!:5 9 B B A 
25 33 36 B A 8 B 
2 6  40 34 B B B A 
J OO 87 83 72 60 50 37 30 30 
1 3 5 1 0 0  8 A B S B S S S S A 
2 35 50 A A B B A A A S A A
3 50 1 0  A B A A A A A A A A 
4 35 40 B B B S B EI A B A A
5 25 34 B B 8 B B B B A A A
6 50 31 A A A A A A A B B S 
7 4 5  36 A A A A A A A A A B 
8 48 41 A A A A A A B A B B 
9 49 49 B B B A B A S B A B 
l 0 !:52 39 A A A A A A A A B B 
I I 55 55 A A B A B A A B A B 
1 2  55 53 A A A A A A S A B B 
I 3 55 57 B e e e B e A A A A 
1 4  6 1  53 A A A A A A e e B B 
J 5 66 53 A A A A A A S B B B 
16 50 6 1  B e e B B B A A A A 
I 7 64 68 B B B B 9 B A A A A 
18 55 64 A B S B S A A A A A 
I 9 50 58 B B 9 B S S A A A A 
20 62 6 1  B e A A A A e B B a 
Table Cl 
Raw Data 
ao 3 7  Be 
83 60 1 0 0  1 2S 20 B e e A 
1 50 JO A A e A 2 !:5 25 A A A e 
2 55 25 A A e A 3 10 10 B A e e 
3 56 60 B e A e 4 30 S A  A e A 
4 70 70 B e e A 5 40 4 5  B e A e 
5 70 6!5 A A A A 6 35 35 A A A e 
6 70 75 8 e A e 7 50 4 5  A A e A 
7 70 80 8 e A e 8 50 60 A A A e 
8 90 80 A A A A 9 55 50 8 e e A 
9 90 85 9 e e A I 0 40 45 A A A e 
J 0 83 BO A e A A 1 I 45 35 B e e A 
J 1 BO 8!:5 A A A e 1 2  50 40 B e e A 
1 2  B3 BO A A A A 1 3  50 4 5  B e e A 
1 3 B0 83 A A A e 1 4  40 40 A A A A 
1 4 83 83 A  A A e 1 5  42 39 8 e e A 
1 5 83 BO A  A A e 1 6  40 37 B e e A 
17 40 37 B e e A 
C27 
1 0 0  8 8  8 3  72 6 0  5 0  3 7  30 1 8 1 00 J S  8 3  6 0  50 3 7  30 30 1 8  3 0  
1 40 4 0  B e A B A B A B A A a B 9 B B A A B A A 
2 60 4 5  S A A B A A 9 8 B B A B A A A B B 8 A B 
3 63 30 e A A A A A B e B A A B A A e B B 8 B 9 
4 37 35 A A A B A A A A B 8 A B A A A 9 8 A B B 
:; 29 42 B A 8 8 8 B 8 A A 8 9 A 9 B 8 A A A A A 
6 50 32 A 8 A A A A e e e A A B A A A 8 B B B A 
7 41 35 B 8 A A A A 9 B 8 8 A B A A A 9 B B 9 B 
8 26 37 B B 8 A B B 8 B A A S A B 8 B A A A B A 
9 43 30 A A A A A A A a B e A e A A A 9 B B B e 
l 0 40 35 A A A A A A B A 9 A A e A A A B e 8 e B 
1 1  39 33 8 A A B A A e e B A A e A A A B 8 B 8 e 
1 2  36 38 B B 9 9 B B A 8 A A B A B B B A A A A A 
I 3 39 35 8 A A A A A B 9 B 8 A B A A A B B B B B 
I 4 38 30 A A A A A A A B B B A e A A A B e e e e 
1 5  41 32 A A A A A A A B 8 A A B A A A B a B B e 
1 6  42 33 A A A A A A A 8 B A A 9 A A A 8 B e e 9 
1 7 44 35 A A A A A A A 8 B A A 9 A A A B B B B B 
I e 40 38 A A A B A A A B A A A B A A A B B e B B 
I 9 45 40 B A A S A A A B B B A B A A A B B B B S 
2 0  40 40 A 8 A A B A A 9 A A B A A B A A B A 8 B 
21 42 42 A 8 A A B A A B A B e 9 A B A A 8 A a A 
22 46 42 A A A A A A A 9 8 A A 9 A A A 8 e B 9 e 
23 51 4 1  A A A 9 B A A 9 9 A A B A A A B B S B A 
24 49 4 4  A A A B A A A 9 B A A B A A A B e A a B 
25 50 45 B A A B A A A B 8 B A 8 A A A B B B B B 
I :; 30 8 A e e 
2 51 50 A e A A 18 30 50 60 72 8 9 1 0 0  
3 4 8 1 0 0  A A A A 0 1 1  6 A A A A A A e A 
4 35 52 B A e e 2 20 6!:5 B e A e e e e e 
!:5 49 56 B A e e 3 60 95 8 A A e e e A e 
6 55 59 e A e e 4 87 75 A e e A A e A A 
? 62 6 1  B e e A 5 90 90 S A e e e A e e 
8 90 6 1  B e e A 6 BO I O O  A A A A e A e A 
9 6 1  60 B e e A ? ?5 87 A A A A A e A e 
1 0 59 62 8  A e e 8 70 70 A A A A e A e e 
1 1 60 63 A  A A e 9 70 65 B e e e e A A A 
J 2 6 1  63 A A A e I 0 60 67 A A A A A e A e 
1 3 60 55 8 e e A 1 1 85 65 8 e e e e A e A 
1 4 30 55 8 A e e 1 2  60 65 A A A A A e e A 
1 5  57 54 A e A A 1 3 55 55 8  A e A A e e e 
16 63 60 A e A A 1 4  54 60 A A A A A e A e 
17 64 !:59 8 e • A 1 5 50 55 A  A A A A e A A 
J 8 6 1  58 9 e e A 1 6  44 65 A A A A A e A A 
J 9 58 !:58 A  A A A 1 7  41 35 B e e e A A e e 
20 59 60 8 A e e 
C26 
J O O  30 37 50 60 72 72 93 88 1 00 1 00 8 8  37 72 6 0  6 0  37 30 88 
1 50 ,0 A B 8 A A B A A B 8 B A A A A A A A A B 
2 S6 60 B B A B A B e B B 8 e B B A 8 B e A A A 
3 65 6 J  A A B B B B A A A B A A A B A A A A B A 
4 62 :59 A A A A B S A A A A A A A 8 A A A A B A 
5 66 66 B A 9 B B B B A B e 8 A 8 A e A B a A B 
6 7 1  6S A A A B B 8 A A A A A A A B A A B A A A 
7 '' 69 B B A A A A B A e e a e B A A B A e A e 
B 63 67 B B A A A A B B e 8 e 9 e A e A B B A B 
9 69 72 B 8 A A A A e e A 9 e e B A e A A A e B 
10 7 1  68 A A A 8 B e A B A B A A A e B B A B A A 
1 1  76 69 B A A B e B A A A e A A A 9 8 B e B e A 
1 2  69 66 A A A B 8 B A A A A A A A B A B B 8 A A 
1 3  7 1  73 9 B A A A A e e B A B B B A B A A A 9 e 
1 4  72 6i' 8 A A B B B A B A B A A A B 8 B 8 B 8 A 
1 5  69 72 8 B A A A A B B B e e B B A B A A A A B 
1 6  69 67 e A A e B 8 A B A B A A A B B B e B B A 
J 7 74 73 A A B B 8 9 A A A B A A A B A S S 8 A A 
I B 64 66 A e A A A A B A B A e B 8 A A A A A A B 
J 9 73 76 B B A A A A B B B 8 B B 9 A 9 A A A A B 
20 6 1  70 A B A A A A B A B 8 B 8 B A 8 A A A A B 
2 1  77 70 A A 9 B B B A A A B A A A 8 A A A A B A 
22 6 1  i'O A 9 A A A A B A 8 A El B 8 A A A A A S B 
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